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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1832, Chancellor Kent wrote in his famed Commentaries on Amer-
ican Law:
There is no branch of the law of real property which embraces a greater
variety of important interests, or which is of more practical application
[than the law of mortgages]. The different, and even conflicting views,
which were taken of the subject by the courts of law and of equity, have
given an abstruse and shifting character to the doctrine of mortgages.'
The recent bombshell decision of the Ohio Supreme Court in the case
of Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough' constitutes ample evidence
of the continuing validity of Chancellor Kent's observation regarding the
"abstruse and shifting character" of the doctrines which constitute the
theoretical foundations of the law of mortgages. This article consists of
an examination and analysis of these theoretical foundations 3 insofar as
they relate to mortgage loans which contemplate future advances.4
* Member of the Ohio and Indiana Bars.
lIV J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AmRICAN LAw, 135 (2d ed. 1832).
2 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 228 N.E.2d 841 (1967). Yarborough is discussed in Recent Decision,
Mortgages-Lien and Priority-Mortgages and Mechanic's Liens, 19 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
423 (1968); Comment, Construction Mortages In Ohio, 29 OHIO ST. L J. 917 (1968)
3 For those "practical" lawyers who disdain theoretical discussions, attention is drawn to the
following comment made by Oliver Wendel Holmes, Jr.:
"Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the
most important man who takes part in the building of a house .... It [theory] is not
to be feared as impractical, for, to the competent, it simply means going to the bot-
tom of the subject."
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 477 (1897).
4 A great deal has been written about future advance mortgages. For the most part, very little,
if anything has been said concerning most matters discussed in this article. Major treatises which
cover the subject are: 4 AMERICAN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, Chap. IV (1952); III G. GLENN,
MORTGAGES, DEEDS OF TRUST, AND OTHER SECURITY DEVICES As To LAND, §§392
et. seq. (1943); 1 L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY,
§§447 et seq. (8th ed. 1928); 4 J. KENT, supra note 1, at 135 et seq.; G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES, §§113 et seq. (1951); D. PINGREY, A TREATISE ON THE LAw
OF MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY, §§483 et seq. (1893); R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, §442 (1967); 9 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTARIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY, §4747 et seq. (1958); 5 H. TIFFANY, THE LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, §1463 et seq.
(3d ed. 1939).
The works by Osborne and Glenn demonstrate more critical scholarship than is found in the
other treatises which often mimic each other. The material which appears in 4 AMERICAN LAw
OF PROPERTY, Chap. IV was taken directly from Osborne.
It is rather ironic that the best discussion by far of future advance mortgages appears in Pro-
fessor Gilmore's treatise on personal property. II G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSON-
AL PROPERTY, Ch. 35 (1965). Gilmore's work is brilliant. It is the logical starting point for any
venture into the field of future advance mortgages. A recent student comment in the UNIvER-
SITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW which analyzes future advance lending under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (personal property) is also very helpful in understanding similar problems in-
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II. THE MECHANICS AND ECONOMICS OF FUTURE
ADVANCE LENDING
An appreciation of the mechanics by which a mortgage loan for future
advances is created and administered is a necessary prerequisite to a mean-
ingful examination and analysis of the theoretical foundations which
underlie such a loan. Accordingly, this article will first discuss the gene-
sis and administration of a typical mortgage loan for future advances.
All future advance mortgages attest to the existence of four economic
"facts of life," namely:
1. A borrower who lacks financial stability to such an extent that a lender
requires that any loan made to the borrower be secured.
2. A borrower who owns real estate which can secure repayment by the
borrower of the amount loaned to him.
3. A lender who requires, for reasons which he need justify only to him-
self, that the loan proceeds be disbursed on an installment basis and a bor-
rower who can make effective use of the proceeds on such a basis.
4. Real estate which, when mortgaged to the lender by the borrower, will
possess, or be capable of possessing, value at least equal to the amount
loaned to him.5
A multitude of transactions exist in which business desirability and the
economic facts of life dictate the use of a mortgage loan for future ad-
vances.0 Financing the construction of a shopping center, a commercial
volving mortgages. See Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lending Under The Uniform
Commercial Code, 35 U. Cm.I- REV. 128 (1967).
In footnote 1 to Section 35.1 of his treatise, Gilmore cites various A.L.R. annotations and
law review articles which serious students of the future advance mortgage might like to consult.
Gilmore feels the most useful law review articles are: Blackburn, Mortgages to Secure Future
Advances, 21 Mo. L. REV. 209 (1956); Jones, Mortgages Securing Future Advances, 8 TEYL L
REV. 371 (1930); Reddish, Open-End Mortgage and Priorities in Nebraska, 38 NEB. L. REv.
172 (1959). Law review material specifically treating Ohio future advance mortgage law can be
found in: Note, Mortgages-Future Advances-Obligatory and Non-Obligatory Advances in
Ohio, 1 U. CiN. L. REV. 348 (1927) and Note, Ohio Lien Priority Rules Affecting Mortgages,
Mechanic's Liens, and Fixture Security Interests, 18 W. RES. L REv. 1284 (1967).
Those who wish to verify how little the law of future advance mortgages has developed in
the past century should read Redfield, The Necessity Of Describing The Security Upon the Reg-
istry. Mortgages to Secure Future Advances, and Where The Securities Have Been Changed, 11
AmERICAN LAW REGISTER 1 (1862).
rSee Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lending Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
35 U. Cms. L. REv. 128, 129-30 (1967).
6 Various transactions which give rise to future advance mortgage financing are enumerated
in Comment, supra note 5 at 130-31, n. 13. It reads:
"Every early 'leading' case in the future advances field shows the use of the future ad-
vances mortgage of real estate either to provide or to underwrite working capital for
business enterprise. See Shirras v. Craig, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 34 (1812) (financing of
merchants); Ackerman v. Hunsicker, 85 N.Y. 43 (1881) (indorsing business firm's
notes); Robinson v. Williams, 22 N.Y. 380, 383 (1860) (mortgage of bank premises
to cover fluctuating balance); Hopkinson v. Rolt, 9 H.L. Cas. 514, 11 Eng. Rep.
829 (1861) (working capital for shipbuilder).
For like use of the future advances device, see Bell v. Radcliff, 32 Ark. 645
(1878) (deed of trust to cotton crop to secure advances of supplies needed by part-
nership to cultivate a plantation); Tapia v. Demartini, 77 Cal. 383, 19 P. 641 (1888)
(mortgage to cover equipment sold to mining partnership); Langerman v. Puritan
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housing project or a manufacturing plant are typical examples of trans-
actions involving the use of such a loan. Under a mortgage loan for
future advances, the lender may agree, for example, to lend $1,000,000
to the borrower. The borrower, in -turn, agrees to use the loan proceeds
to construct the facility in question. In order to provide security for re-
payment of the loan, the borrower executes and delivers to the lender a
mortgage deed covering the land upon which the facility is to be con-
structed. Installments of the loan proceeds are then advanced by the
lender to the borrower as the work progresses on the facility. In this
manner, the lender minimizes the risk of his -investment by insuring that
the loan proceeds are in fact used to increase the value of the mortgaged
land. At the same time, the borrower is assured of a continuing supply
of capital which he may use to pay the debts incurred by him in erecting
the facility.
As the preceding example indicates, many advantages inhere in the use
of future advance mortgage financing. Every major real property treatise
sings the praise of such financing. The borrower pays interest not on the
face amount of the mortgage loan, but rather only on the amount of the
loan actually disbursed to him (interest -is computed on each disburse-
ment from the date thereof). 7  In addition, he is relieved of the eco-
nomic necessity of securing a proper investment for surplus funds until he
is ready to employ them in the loan project. Future advance lending also
permits the borrower to avoid the expense and inconvenience of obtain-
Dining Room Company, 21 Cal. App. 637, 132 P. 617 (1913) (mortgage to seure line
of credit to dining room company); Boswell v. Goodwin, 31 Conn. 74 (1862) (mort-
gage to cover indorsement of paper manufacturer's notes and advances); Weiser Loan
& Trust Co. v. Comerford, 41 Ida. 172, 238 P.515 (1925) (mortgage to secure fluc-
tating balance); Speer v. Skinner, 35 Ill. 282 (1864) (hotel furniture mortgaged by
hotel operators to secure advances of working capital); Collins v. Carlile, 13 Ill.
254 (1851) (mortgage by merchant to cover purchases of goods from a St. Louis
distributor); Louisville Banking Co. v. Leonard, 90 Ky. 106, 13. S.W. 521 (1890)(mortgage to secure discount of customer notes of furniture manufacturer); Downing
v. Palmateer, 17 Ky. (1 T.B. Mon.) 64 (1824) (mortgage of female slave to cover ad-
vances of liquor and other necessaries to tavern keepers in Lexington); Hall v. Jay,
131 Mass. 192 (1881) (mortgage to secure purchases of coal by a retail coal-dealer from
a wholesaler); Commercial Bank v. Cunningham, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 270 (1837)
(mortgage to secure future indemnities); McDaniels v. Colvin, 16 Vt. 300 (1884)(mortgage to cover what may be owed "on book"); Brinkerhoff v. Marvin, 5 Johns.
Ch.R. 320 (N.Y. 1821); Hendricks v. Robinson, 2 Johns. Ch. 283 (N.Y. 1817). Early
cases showing use of future advances for building construction do exist, but their ap-
pearance in the reports is infrequent until near the turn of the century. See Crane v.
Deming, 7 Conn. 386 (1829) (mortgage to secure advances for construction of a bridge
over the Passaic River); Barry v. Merchants' Exchange Co., 1 Sandf. Ch. 280 (N.Y.
1844) (mortgage to construct 'a granite fire-proof building [in New York], which
should be commensurate to the wants, as well as honorable to the munificent of the
commercial metropolis of the western world')."
7 As a matter of commercial practice, lenders often do not require the borrower to commence
amortizing his loan until the facility erected on the real estate has been completed. At this
point, the facility often furnishes a source of income to borrower who uses such income to amor-
tize the loan.
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ing a new loan each time he has need of an additional sum; consequently,
he often avoids higher interest rates.
The use of future advance financing is not a one-way street. The
lender is also benefited by the use of such financing. It promotes addi-
tional borrowing since it minimizes the bother and cost of frequent individ-
ual loans. In addition, such financing permits the lender to retain the
right to disburse the mortgage loan in installments as the value of the
mortgaged property increases rather than initially disbursing the entire
amount of the loan at a time when the land securing the loan may possess
less value than -the amount to be disbursed.
III. THE YARBOROUGH RATIONALE
An examination and analysis of any given judicial doctrine presup-
poses, quite naturally, both the existence of the doctrine and the ability
of the examiner to effectively isolate and extract it from the relevant
portions of judicial opinions treating the subject with which the doctrine
is concerned. Because of the tendency of the judiciary to obscure or
mask with legal fictions the considerations which dictate the outcome of
a given case, the task of isolation and extraction is far more arduous than
the average practicing lawyer might expect." Such is the case with the
landmark decision of Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough.
In July, 1967, the Ohio Supreme Court handed down the Yarborough
opinion. It is lengthy and complex. Already this decision has prompted
many institutional lenders to reassess and restructure their future advance
lending procedures and has caused title insurance companies to revamp
their standard interim binder forms. It has also generated considerable
discussion among members of the bench, the bar and the academic com-
munity. One commentator has intimated that Yarborough will long be
remembered for ". . . its impressive and exhaustive treatment of mortgage
law." However, a systematic isolation, extraction and analysis of the
theories which support the Yarborough decision will reveal that the opin-
ion is impressive primarily for the numerous vital questions which it
leaves unanswered and is exhaustive only in the sense that its obscurantism
and internal inconsistencies will exhaust anyone who chooses to study it
carefully.
While the facts of Yarborough are complex, its principal holding is
simple: All future advances made pursuant to a mortgage which does not
require such advances are subsequent in priority to any liens which attach
to the mortgaged premises after the -recording of the mortgage but before
8 Walter V. Schaefer, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Illinois has remarked: "It may be
conceded that judicial opinions are something less than mirrors of the thinking behind the de-
cision .... " Schaefer, Precedent and Policy, 34 U. CHL L R.EV. 3 (1966).
9 Recent Decision, supra note 2, at 423.
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such advances are made."0 The Yarborough Court gropingly attempted
to articulate the theoretical doctrines which supported its holding. Speak-
ing through Judge O'Neil it stated:
The rationale for holding [optional] future advances to be subject to en-
cumbrances attaching after the recording of the mortgage to secure ad-
vances is found in the cases of Spader v. Lawler..., and Second Nation-
al Bank of Warren v. Boyle .... The first and most important part of
this rationale is the notion ... of a mortgage as security for a debt. As
said in Spader v. Lawler . . . "If nothing ever was advanced, no one
would pretend that it was a mortgage. A mortgage is a security for the
payment of money. If there was no money due, there could be nothing to
secure and consequently no mortgage."
The second rationale is the lack of notice furnished to subsequent en-
cumbrances by a prior recorded mortgage securing advances which may or
may not be made.
Where the mortgagee is, in fact, firmly bound to make advances (i.e.,
they are "obligatory") for a certain purpose, under definite conditions and
in a certain amount, both branches of the preceding rationale are substan-
tially satisfied."
Both "branches" of the Court's rationale will now be examined and
analyzed in detail since they constitute the cornerstone of the law of fu-
ture advance mortgages in Ohio and reveal the existence of various doc-
trines which, if adopted, will drastically alter the Ohio requirements gov-
erning the drafting, validity and priority of such mortgages.
'
0 The Yarborough Court qualified its holding as enumerated in the text above to an infi-
nitesimally small extent when it stated that priority will be awarded to an intervening lienor
over the original mortagee only if the original mortgagee possesses constructive notice of the
intervening lien before he makes his advances, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 219, 228 N.E.2d 841,
857. Of course, when the intervening lien is a judgment lien the original mortgagee will always
possess constructive notice of such lien since the lien cannot exist unless it is duly recorded in the
appropriate county recorder's office, OHno REVISED CODE ANN. §2329.02-.03. (Page 1953 and
Supp. 1968). When the intervening lien is a mortgage, it will nearly always be recorded. Thus
here also, the original mortgagee will be charged with constructive notice, OHIO RvSED CODE
ANN. §5301.23 (Page 1953). When the intervening lien is a mechanic's lien, the chances are
at least good that the lien will be placed of record, OHIO REVISED CODE ANN. §1311.06 (Page
Supp. 1968), so as to charge the mortgagee with constructive notice thereof. Moreover, even if
the mechanic's lien is not recorded when the original mortgagee makes his advance, courts nearly
always hold such facts exist with respect to the mortgaged property (e.g., evidence of construc-
tion) as are necessary to charge the mortgagee with notice of the mechanic's lien. Wayne Bldg.
& Loan Co. v. Yarborough 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 219-20, 228 N.B.2d 841, 857-58. Thus as a
matter of practicality, the constructive notice requirement is, in most instances, no requirement
at all.
1111 Ohio St. 2d, at 216-16, 228 N.E.2d at 855. The future advance mortgage involved
in Yarborough was a statutory construction mortgage, See, OHIo REvIsED CODE ANN. §1311.14(Page 1962). Since the mortgage in Yarborough failed to comply with the disbursing require-
ments of §1311.14, the Court treated Yarborough's mortgage as a non-statutory, common-law
future advance mortgage. Because of this treatment, the doctrines of the Yarborough case can
logically be interpreted as encompassing all future advance mortgages, with the possible exception
of the statutory open-end mortgage. See Part VIII infra.
[Vol. 30
FUTURE ADVANCE MORTGAGES
IV. THE FIRST RATIONALE - A MORTGAGE As SECURITY
FOR A DEBT
A. The Yarborough Case
As previously pointed out, the Yarborough Court states that the first
and most important rationale for holding optional "future advances to
be subject to encumbrances attaching after the recording of a mortgage to
secure advances .. . .- 12 is found in ". . . the notion . .. of a mortgage as
security for a debt."'1 3 Thus, the court states:
As said in Spader v. Lawler . . . "A mortgage is a security for the pay-
ment of money. If there was no money due, there could be nothing to
secure, and consequently no mortgage." This position was reaffirmed in
Second National Bank v. Boyle... wherein it was made dear that a mort-
gage to secure future advances was not invalid in Ohio, but that it was not
a lien until the advances were made on the faith of the mortgage, if they
were not obligatory advances.
Where the mortgagee is, in fact, firmly bound to make advances (i.e.,
they are "obligatory") . . . [the rationale of a mortgage as security for a
debt is] . . . substantially satisfied .... As to the concept of a mortgage
as security for a debt, "as the mortgagee is bound from the date of his
agreement to make the advance, the obligation to repay him, from his
point of view, arises at that time" [Citation omitted]. . . . Furthermore,
it would be inequitable not to accord priority to the obligatory advances of
the mortgagee. He is bound to make the advances, and he cannot avoid
doing so without breaking his contract, and it can, therefore, no longer be
urged that it is inequitable for him to make advances after knowledge of
the intervening claim. . . . [Citation omitted]. As was declared in the
Kuhn case.. . "upon what principle, then, of equity or public policy can it
be said that such mortgagee must again search the records before making
each advance to the mortgagor? The search would be a vain thing, since
the advance for further loan would remain obligatory, whatever the state of
the title disclosed."' 14
The preceding quotations furnish an excellent example of the obscur-
antism which abounds in the Yarborough opinion. First, the court dis-
cusses the concept of a mortgage as security for a debt. Then it abruptly
"shifts gears," cites Second National Bank v. Boyle"5 and intimates that
the debt concept cannot be satisfied by a non-obligatory mortgage for fu-
ture advances. Finally, it in effect states that the debt concept is satisfied
by an obligatory future advance mortgage. At no point does the court at-
tempt to articulate for the bewildered students of the opinion the vitally
important relationship between the debt concept and the concept of ob-
ligatory and non-obligatory advances.
12 11 Ohio St. 2d at 215,228 N.E.2d at 855.
13Id. at 215-16, 228 N.E.2d at 855.
U Id. at 216-17, 228 N.E.2d at 855-56.
15 155 Ohio St. 482, 99 N.E.2d 474 (1951).
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B. Historical Evolution of the Debt Concept
The relationship between the debt concept and the concept of obliga-
tory and non-obligatory loan advances can best be explained by examining
the historical evolution of certain portions of mortgage law. This exami-
nation will reveal how, in the words of Chief Justice Cockburn, the com-
mon law of mortgages has "... . expanded and enlarged so as to meet the
wants and requirements of trade....""
The common law concept of a mortgage as security for a debt can be
traced back to at least the 12th Century.17 During the following seven
centuries, the concept of a mortgage and accompanying debt were insepa-
rable in the eyes of the law - a mortgage could not exist unless it secured
the payment of a pre-existing debt. By the early 1800's, the American
economy ,had developed to a point where the need for secured future
advance financing began to manifest itself.18 As a result, lenders began
to record mortgages which required the mortgagee to advance to the bor-
rower the face amount of the mortgage (i.e., the loan proceeds) sub-
sequent to the recording of the mortgage. In short, lenders began to re-
cord mortgages which did not, on the date of recordation, secure a debt.
Courts which were obviously hospitable to secured future advance fi-
nancing were thus confronted with the conceptual thorn - a mortgage
could not exist unless it secured a pre-existing debt. Therefore, if no
debt existed, then a prospective borrower could not create a mortgage,
merely by signing a document designated as such.
The early reported opinions which deal with the validity of obligatory
future advance mortgages vividly attest to the widely heralded adaptive
characteristics of our common law system. These opinions reveal the
two methods by which courts skirted the conceptual hurdle of the debt
concept. Many courts embraced the "relationback" doctrine - a judicial
fiction which permitted them to sustain both the validity and priority
of the obligatory future advance mortgage. With deceptive simplicity,
these courts stated that each obligatory advance, when made, related back
16 Goodwin v. Roberts, L.R. 10 Exch. 337, 346 (1875). Regarding the historical approach
in analyzing legal concepts, Cardoza has stated:
"Let me speak first of those fields where there can be no progress without history.
I think the law of real property supplies the readiest example"
B. CARiozo, THE NATuRE, OF THE JUDICAL PROCESS, 54-55 (1921) [footnotes
omitted].
Justice Holmes stated:
"[The law] ... cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corrola-
ries of a book of mathematics. In order to know where it is, we must know what it has
been..." 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
174 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, at §16.64. It is unlikely the debt concept
existed prior to the 12th century "... for the simple reason that in primitive stages of society
the institution of credit... [was] unknown .... Id.18 It is stated the need for future advance financing manifested itself in the early 1800's since
the author was unable to discover any significant number of future advance cases decided prior
to such date.
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to the date the mortgage was recorded and thus "obviously" created a debt
as of such date.19 Other courts embraced the more sophisticated "obliga-
tion" concept. These courts boldly announced that an obligatory future
advance mortgage need not secure a pre-existing debt. They pointed out:
... that the obligation secured by the mortgage for future advances is the
legally binding, single promise of the mortgagor, made when the transac-
tion is first entered into, to repay all of those advances within the scope
of the agreement which actually are made then and later. The obligation
secured does not consist of a series of separate and independent promises
by the mortgagor, each one requiring its own consideration, but of one
promise covering the entire group of specified present and subsequent
transactions.20
Courts in a few jurisdictions, including Ohio, seemed reluctant in cases
involving future advance mortgages to employ any fiction which would
result in scrapping the citadel of debt.21 In this regard, the landmark
Ohio case is Spader v. Lawler.22 In Spader, the Ohio Supreme Court in-
timated that the existence of any mortgage for future advances (obliga-
tory or otherwise) dates not from the moment of its execution or recorda-
tion, but rather from the future date when the loan advances are made
- apparently on the theory that at the moment such advances are made,
a debt is created which permits the mortgage to spring into existence.23
In 1920, in Kuhn v. The Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co.24 the Ohio
Supreme Court for the first time discussed the differing legal conse-
quences which attached to obligatory and non-obligatory future advance
mortgages. In Kuhn, the court first pointed out that the mortgagee in
question had obligated itself to make certain future loan advancements.
The court then held that due to the obligatory nature of the advance-
ments, the priority of the mortgage dated from its recording. Nearly
half of the court's opinion was devoted to distinguishing the off-cited
Spader opinion which had failed to differentiate between obligatory and
non-obligatory future advance mortgages. The court stated:
1 9 See Brinkmeyer v. Browneller, 55 Ind. 487 (1876). Gilmore points out one risk in coun-
sel's advocating the court's adoption of the relationback doctrine:
" there can be no mortgage without a debt; if there is ever a moment when there
is no debt, then there is no mortgage; if there is no mortgage, there is nothing to
which the future advances can "relate back." It cannot be guaranteed that some court
in an aberrant moment will not be persuaded by the conceptual argument; the wise
mortgagee will see to it that there is always an outstanding obligation...
II G. GLMfORE, supra note 4, at 924.
20 4 A c.AN LAW o PROPERTY, supra note 4, at 133-35. Also see, 4 J. POmROY,
EQurry Ju usPRUDENcs, 595 (4th ed. 1918); R. POWELL, supra note 4, at 564-65; 5 I-. TIF-
FANY, supra note 4, at 144 (Cum. Supp. and cases cited.)
21 E.g., Pettibone v. Griswald, 4 Conn. 158, 10 Am. Dec. 106 (1822).
'217 Ohio 371 (1848). The best discussion of Spader appears in Note, Mortgages-Fu-
ture Advances-Obligatory and Non-Oblgatory Advances in Ohio, 1 U. CIN. L. REv. 348
(1927).
23 Note, supra note 22, at 354.
24 101 Ohio St 34, 126 N.E. 820 (1920).
1969]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Certain it is, the actual decision in ... [Spader v. Lawler] was made with
reference to future advances, neither the amount nor the purpose of which
was specified in the instrument. Moreover, there was not involved in that
case the question of future advances which the mortgagee was under obli-
gation to make.
In the instant case, the situation is radically different. The record of the
earlier mortgage [given to The Southern Ohio Loan & Trust Co.] was no-
tice to the world that the mortgagee therein had obligated itself to loan the
mortgagor a certain sum upon the faith of the title as it then was. Upon
what principal, then, of equity or public policy, can it be said that such
mortgagee must again search the records before making each advance to
mortgagor? The search would be a vain thing, since the advance or
further loan would remain obligatory, whatever the state of the tide dis-
dosed.2 5
The court in Kuhn did not specifically disapprove of the frightening
intimation set forth in the Spader decision (i.e., a mortgage cannot exist
unless it secures a debt). Nevertheless, the import of Kuhn was rela-
tively clear - courts will treat an obligatory future advance mortgage
which on the date of recordation does -not secure a debt exactly like a mort-
gage which, on the date of recordation, secures a pre-existing debt.
The Yarborough opinion has removed any doubts which may have
lingered with respect to Kuhn's effect. Yarborough unequivocally states
though by way of dicta:
Where the mortgagee is, in fact, firmly bound to make advances (i.e., they
are "obligatory") ... [the rationale of a mortgage as security for a debt is]
.. substantially satisfied 2 6
Thus, thanks to Yarborough it can be said with confidence that Ohio, like
her sister states, recognizes that an obligatory mortgage for future ad-
vances can peacefully co-exist with the debt concept.
C. The Role of Debt and Obligation In Determination of
Mortgage Priority
Now that the preceding examination of the historical evolution of
mortgage law has explained the relationship between the debt concept
and the concept of obligatory and non-obligatory loan advances, attention
can be focused directly on the following question: Why was the Yar-
borough Court so interested in ascertaining whether the mortgagee was
obligated to advance to the mortgagor the face amount of the mortgage
(i.e., the loan proceeds) ? The answer to this question lies, of course, in
the fact that the sole function of the obligatory - non-obligatory concept
is to determine the priority which will be accorded to any given future
advance mortgage. That is to say, an obligatory future advance mortgage
25 Id. at 37, 126 N.E at 821.
26 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 216, 228 N.E.2d 841, 855 (1967).
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will be accorded the same priority (priority from the date of recordation)
as a so-called "normal" mortgage27 since the mortgagee's obligation to
disburse under such a mortgage and the consequential obligation to repay
on the part of the mortgagor is, as has been previously shown, the legal
equivalent of the pre-existing debt under the "normal mortgage." On
the other hand, the priority of each future advance under a non-obliga-
tory mortgage dates not from the time of recordation, but from the date
of the advance since it is only from such date that a debt is created. 8
The preceding analysis reveals the court's reasoning process in Yar-
borough was, with respect to the first rationale, considerably more sophis-
ticated than the opinion itself indicates.2 9 In this regard, the analysis
indicates the Court took the following mental steps in formulating its
holding that each loan advance under a non-obligatory future advance
mortgage takes priority only from the date of such advance:
1. When a "normal mortgage" is recorded, the mortgagor owes a
debt to the mortgagee and the mortgage serves as security for the pay-
ment of the debt (this is the court's "first rationale"). Because the
mortgage secures payment of a pre-existing debt, the law has long recog-
nized that it is only equitable that the priority of the mortgage date from
the moment of its recordation.30
2. When a future advance mortgage is recorded, the mortgagor owes
no debt to the mortgagee and therefore the mortgage cannot, at such time,
secure the payment of a pre-existing debt.
3. A recorded future advance mortgage may obligate the mortgagee
to thereafter advance to the mortgagor the loan proceeds. If so, it neces-
sarily follows that the mortgage note obligates the mortgagor to repay to
the mortgagee those proceeds which he will thereafter receive. Since
the obligation of the mortgagor will eventually ripen into a debt, a court
is justified in equating the obligation concept with the debt concept.
This, in turn, dictates the conclusion that in determining priority, an ob-
ligatory future advance mortgage which is predicated upon the obligation
concept must be treated exactly like a normal mortgage which is predi-
cated on the debt concept (i.e., the priority of both mortgages dates from
the moment of their recordation).
4. A recorded future advance mortgage may not obligate the mort-
gagee to thereafter advance to the mortgagor any proceeds. If the mort-
gagee is not obligated to advance proceeds to the mortgagor it necessarily
2 7 A "normal" mortgage is a mortgage which on the date of its recordation secures the pay-
ment to the mortgagee of an amount owed by the mortgagor. The most common example of a
"normal" mortgage is a purchase-money mortgage.
28 See text accompanying note 23 and the authority cited therein.
29 See Schaefer, supra note 8, at 7 who states:
"Many an opinion, fair upon its fact and ringing in its phrases, fails by a wide margin
to reflect accurately the state of mind of the court which delivered it."
3 0 As between two unrecorded mortgages, the one first in time prevails.
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follows as a matter of definition that no debt can, at the date of recorda-
tion, exist with respect -to optional advances which the mortgagee may
thereafter choose to make. In this instance, it also follows that the legal
equivalent of the debt concept (the obligation of the mortgagee to ad-
vance loan proceeds and the corresponding obligation of the mortgagor
to repay proceeds so advanced) oes not then exist. Thus, the priority
of advances under an optional future advance mortgage will date from
the moment of each advance since it is only at -this moment that a debt is
created.
Unfortunately, the Yarborough Court articulated only a few of the
above mental steps taken by it."' The Court's failure to articulate the
other steps in its reasoning process has and 'will continue to create con-
fusion in an area of the law which is already thoroughly confusing. -
Accordingly, at the earliest possible moment, the Court should set forth
in full the reasons which support the various statements made in Yar-
borough about the ,debt concept and the priority of obligatory and non-
obligatory future loan advances.
D. Future Articulation of Priority Rules
When and if the Supreme Court eventually chooses to articulate the
exact reasons why the priority of an obligatory future advance mortgage
dates from its recordation, the Court will, in all likelihood, embrace either
the relationback fiction or the obligation concept. The relationback fic-
tion has been sparcely employed in recent years. This sparceness of use is
probably attributable to increased judicial sophistication which refuses to
tolerate the continued employment of such -a patent fiction. Because the
Ohio Supreme Court is no less sophisticated than other appellate courts in
this country, it seems reasonable to predict that it will not employ the
relationback fiction.
If the Ohio Supreme Court jettisons the relationback fiction, it will be
compelled to embrace the obligation concept and its attendant fiction.
31 Those who seek to mitigate or justify the Court's failure to dearly articulate the "mental
steps" taken by it with respect to the debt concept, its significance and impact will find support
in the writings of Justice Schaefer. He states:
"William James said, 'When the conclusion is there we have already forgotten
most of the steps preceding its attainment.' And, when I have tried to carry on simul-
taneously the process of decision and of self-analysis, the process of decision has not
been natural. I suspect that which is lacking is not candor but techniques and tools
which are sensitive enough to explore the mind of men and report accurately its con-
scious and subconscious operations." Schaefer, supra note 8, at 23 [footnotes omitted).
32 A court's articulation of each step in its legal reasoning process does more than eliminate
confusion. It also (a) tends to reduce arbitrariness in the judicial process and (b) furnishes a
steady target for those who wish to attack the rule which the reasoning process supports. Be-
cause of this, judicial failure to clearly articulate significant steps in the reasoning process
cannot be justified by invoking the admitted presence of deep subconscious forces, namely "...
the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex of instincts and emo-
tions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he be litigant or judge." B. CAn-
Dozo, supra note 16, at 167.
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The obligation concept compels courts to pretend that a mortgage can ex-
ist before any loan advances are made thereunder. It is submitted that if
the term "mortgage" is defined to reflect economic realities which exist
between a borrower and lender, one is justified in asserting that no mort-
gage for future advances can exist until the first advance is, in fact, made
thereunder. At this juncture, courts and scholars alike would do well to
heed Justice Holmes' injunction that "[w]e should think things ...not
words ... if we are to keep to the real and the true." 3  If we think
"things" and not "words," it becomes much easier to see that notwith-
standing the recordation of a so-called mortgage for future advances, the
so-called mortgagee then possesses none of the "bread and butter" rights
which a properly drafted mortgage always extends to its holder - e.g.,
the right to foreclose, the -right to compel the mortgagor to insure the
mortgaged premises, etc. Since a so-called mortgagee under a so-called
future advance mortgage initially enjoys none of the "bread and butter"
rights which a mortgagee normally makes available to the -holder, it is
submitted that courts should candidly state that even though a mortgage
instrument may be recorded, no mortgage exists until the so-called mort-
gagee possesses the "bread and butter" rights described above (such posses-
sion will, of course, commence with the first advance since at this point
the mortgagee possesses an insurable interest in the premises and a debt
exists with respect to which foreclosure proceedings may, if necessary, be
initiated).
One example will illustrate my contention that courts should candidly
admit that a mortgage for future advances does not spring into existence
merely because it is, without more, placed of record. Assume that on
May 1, X signs and delivers to Y an obligatory future advance mortgage
in the amount of $500.00. The mortgage relates to Blackacre, a parcel
of real estate owned by X. Y records the mortgage on May 2. On May
10, Z loans X $1,000. To secure the repayment of the loan, X signs and
delivers to Z a second mortgage which also relates to Blackacre. Z re-
cords the second mortgage on May 11. On May 30, before Y makes any
loan advances to X, the latter is adjudicated a bankrupt. A Referee in
Bankruptcy orders X's trustee to sell Blackacre at a public auction free
and clear of all mortgage liens. The auction is conducted and Blackacre
is sold to Mr. B.F.P. for $2,000. The Referee then orders the trustee to
marshall all mortgage liens on Blackacre and to distribute the auction
proceeds accordingly. The trustee then determines that even though Y's
mortgage lien dates from the time of recordation, since it is obligatory,
(a) Z, as the second mortgagee, is entitled to receive the first $1,000 of
the auction proceeds, (b) X's general creditors are entitled to receive the
remaining $1,000 of the proceeds, and (c) Y, as the so-called first mort-
83 Holmes, Law In Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L REv. 443, 460 (1899).
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gage lienor, is entitled to receive nothing. The Referee then quite right-
fully approves the trustee's determination. This example illustrates the
awkwardness of pretending a mortgage exists prior to the time any ad-
vances are made thereunder and dictates the conclusion that no mort-
gage exists if the so-called mortgage instrument can, as in the example,
be ignored with impunity. 4
Neither the case law nor the relevant literature explains why nine-
teenth century courts stubbornly refused to admit that the future advance
mortgage is not really a mortgage at all until an advance is made there-
under. The explanation probably lies -in the prevalent nineteenth cen-
tury attitude toward the judicial process. In this regard, the nineteenth
century judiciary obviously desired to accord the same priority to an ob-
ligatory future advance mortgage as it did to a normal mortgage (i.e.,
priority measured from the date of recordation). However, the judiciary
felt that it could justifiably accord such priority to the future advance
mortgage only by employing the relationback doctrine or the obligation
concept - both of which were predicated upon the unwarranted assump-
tion that a mortgage exists when the mortgage instrument is executed
and recorded even though no advances have been made thereunder. Ap-
parently, the judiciary never openly considered the possibility of holding
that while the existence of an obligatory future advance mortgage dates
from the first advance, its priority dates from the recordation of the paper
which embodies the loan terms (i.e., the "mortgage" deed). Why the
judiciary refused to openly consider such a possibility seems relatively
clear - to have extended priority to a mortgage from a date when the
mortgage itself did not exist would have offended the theoretical sym-
metry then prevailing in the law of mortgages.35 Even more importantly,
the admission that the priority of an obligatory future advance mortgage
could precede the existence of the mortgage would have constituted an
open acknowledgment that the courts were formulating new rules so
that the law of mortgages would remain attuned to newly developing fi-
nancial tools. For a court to acknowledge -that it was formulating new
rules (i.e., making new law) instead of merely discovering pre-existing
rules would have constituted an almost unforgiveable heresy in an era
when the teachings of Blackstone -reigned supreme. Thus, judges who
34 A Michigan opinion over a century old best sums up my attitude:
"IThe mortgage instrument without any [present) debt, liability or obligation se-
cured by it can have no present legal effect.... It is but a shadow without a sub-
stance .... "
LaDue v. Detroit & M.R.R., 13 Mich. 380, 397 (1865).
5 "The 'nineteenth century theory' was one of eternal legal conceptions involved
in the very idea of justice and containing potentially an exact rule for every case to be
reached by an absolute process of logical deduction."
B. CARDOZO, supra note 16, at 77-78 [foomotes omitted]. For general discussion of the
symmetry of the law in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see D. BooRS'ri, THE MYs-
TmEious SciENcE oF THE LAw, 20-25, 122-127 (First Beacon Paperback ed. 1958).
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were perhaps wiser than their writings indicate, took the "easy way out"
and created the relationback fiction and the obligation concept with its
attendant fiction. The employment of these devices permitted judges to
develop new and needed rules, though in a manner which rather effec-
tively concealed their development.
The fiction which attends the obligation concept (i.e., a mortgage can
exist before an advance is made thereunder) has, to the best of my knowl-
edge, not yet been questioned by either courts, the bar or scholars. Thus,
even in our day when legal realism reigns virtually unchallenged, the
legal community continues to ignore economic reality by pretending a
mortgage exists 'before any loan advancements are made by the lender.
In view of this refusal to acknowledge economic reality many of today's
practitioners, judges and scholars should carefully examine their own
"legal household" before smiling quite so knowingly over their nineteenth
century counterpart's employment of such real property fictions as John
Doe, the lessee of the plaintiff in an ejectment action and Richard Roe, his
adversary, the casual ejector.36
Of course, to state that "intellectual honesty" (whatever that meansy
dictates the recognition that a future advance mortgage does not spring
into existence until the first loan advance is made does not solve the con-
ceptual problems generated by such mortgages. One such conceptual
problem has already been discussed - the problem of according priority
to an obligatory 'future advance mortgage from a date which precedes the
existence of the mortgage. Assuming that first problem is overcome (i.e.,
assuming courts will accord priority to an obligatory future advance
mortgage from the date when the so-called mortgage 'deed is recorded) a
second conceptual dilemma immediately arises: If the so-called mort-
gage deed is not yet a mortgage, how can such instrument be legally re-
corded in the mortgage records? Questions like these which often can-
not be "logically" answered, 'inevitably arise to plague most legal the-
ories, for the simple reason that the law is organic and the theories which
underly it are static. This is merely one manner of stating that theories
formulated for the legal exigencies of today cannot always adequately
anticipate what legal demands the morrow will bring. In view of this, it
suddenly seems important not that the law should be made theoretically
pure, but only that it should keep pace with society. This, the law has
done by creating the relationback doctrine and the obligation concept -
two devices which justify a court in treating an obligatory future advance
mortgage exactly like a normal mortgage for priority purposes. From a
practical standpoint, we should ask no more of 'it.
30 For an interesting discussion of the functions of the fictitious John Doe (Mr. Doe was
known as "Jackson" in New York) and Richard Roe in real actions at common law, see MILLAR,
COMMON-LAW PLEADING, 35-39 (1912).
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V. THE SECOND RATIONALE - THE NOTICE CONCEPT
A. What Is the Notice Concept?
The Yarborough Court stated that the debt concept is "[tihe first and
most important . . ." rationale insofar as future advance mortgages are
concerned. From the standpoint of the practicing lawyer and his client
'(whether borrower or lender), the Court could not be more wrong. In
the first rationale set forth in Yarborough, the Court has adopted a legal
rule which in one form or another has been rigorously and unanimously
followed since the early 1800's. On the other hand, the second Yar-
borough rationale tends to indicate the Ohio Supreme Court is about to
rewrite (if it 'has not already done so) a large segment of Ohio mort-
gage law and thereby sanction several new legal rules which most juris-
dictions have consistently refused to adopt.
The Yarborough Court states:
The second rationale [for holding optional future advances to be sub-
ject to encumbrances which attach to the premises after the recording of
the future advance mortgage] is the lack of notice furnished to subsequent
encumbrances by a prior recorded mortgage securing advances which may
or may not be made.37
Study of the Yarborough opinion and, in particular, the above-quoted
language Taises the question: "Lack of notice of what?" Most certainly
the Court -does not intend to refer to a subsequent encumbrancer's lack of
notice of the non-obligatory nature of the recorded future advance mort-
gage even though the opinion so states since a subsequent encumbrancer
always takes priority over all advances thereafter made pursuant to the
optional future advance mortgage irrespective of whether or not he
knows (i.e., has "notice") of the non-obligatory nature of the recorded
mortgage. The lack of notice to which the Court refers is obviously the
failure of most recorded future advance mortgages to notify subsequent
encumbrancers of the obligatory nature of the mortgage. 8 Such an as-
sumption is supported by the following language contained in the very
ST 11 Ohio St. 2d at 216, 228 N.E.2d at 855 (1967).
3 8 When the Yarborough Court states that non-obligatory mortgages do not furnish to in-
tervening encumbrancers notice of the non-obligatory nature of the mortgage, 11 Ohio St. 2d at
210, 228 N.E. 2d at 855, it seemingly implies that an obligatory mortgage furnishes the requisite
notice to intervening encumbrancers. Of course, the court is incorrect in its implication - an
obligatory future advance mortgage ordinarily furnishes no notice to an intervening lienor of the
mortgagee's obligation to disburse loan proceeds just as a non-obligatory mortgage furnishes
no notice concerning the absence of a disbursal obligation on the mortgagee's part. Perhaps this
inapplicability of the second rationale to the world of reality explains the court's curious and
criptic comment concerning "the better practice" since if "the better practice" was followed by
mortgagees the court's second rationale would be given vitality. Regarding the better practice,
the Yarborough Court states 11 Ohio St. 2d at 220, 228 N.E.2d at 858:
"Although the better practice would seem to be for the mortgage papers filed for pub-
lic record to contain or refer to the obligation to advance, for such would furnish
notice to the respective mechanic or materialmen that there is a prior lien in the
amount specified, it is not necessary to decide that question for the present."
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recent Ohio Supreme Court case of Akron Savings & Loan Co. v. Ronsom
Homes:
In Yarborough, two bases were asserted in support of the holding that
non-obligatory future advances were subject to encumbrances attaching
after the recording of a mortgage, but before the advances were made.
[The second basis wasi ... that prejudice results to subsequent encum-
brancers from lack of notice of the obligatory nature of the advances con-
templated by the mortgage.39
The above being true, it is evident that the second "rationale" advanced
by the Yarborough Court (i.e., an obligatory future advance mortgage
should give notice to subsequent encumbrancers of its obligatory nature)
completely failed to support the holding (i.e., subsequent encumbrancers
take priority over later optional future advances made under a prior future
advance mortgage). Thus, the Court's statements regarding "lack of no-
tice" constitute mere dicta even though they are disguised as rationale.
However, this dicta as set forth in Yarborough and in Akron Savings &
Loan Co. is dicta which no prudent mortgagee dare ignore. For this rea-
son, it is hereinafter analyzed in depth.
As pointed out, Akron Savings & Loan Co. states ... that prejudice
results to subsequent encumbrancers from lack of notice of the obligatory
nature of the advances contemplated by the mortgage."4  It seems clear
that "prejudice" would result to a subsequent encumbrancer only under
the following fact situation:
A records an obligatory future advance mortgage which relates to real
estate owned by B. However, the recorded mortgage deed does not
contain or refer to A's obligation to make the required loan advances.
Thereafter prospective encumbrancer C searches the mortgage records and
discovers the future advance mortgage given by B to A. C "justifiably"
assumes the mortgage is non-obligatory. Therefore, C loans B $10,000
and "takes back" a purchase-money mortgage on the real estate owned by
B. At this moment C assumes that his mortgage takes priority over A's
supposedly non-obligatory future advance mortgage except to the extent
that A has made advances to B prior to the recording of his (C's) mort-
gage. A then advances B $10,000 pursuant to the terms of the first mort-
gage. B later defaults in repaying the $10,000 to A and A initiates fore-
closure proceedings. B's real estate is sold to X for $15,000. The court
determines that A's mortgage is entitled to first priority since it was ob-
ligatory. The court thus awards A $10,000 of the sale proceeds. The re-
maining $5,000 of the proceeds is awarded to C, who is thereby "prej-
udiced" by his "justifiable" reliance on the failure of the first mortgage
deed to contain or refer to A's obligation to advance the $10,000.
39 15 Ohio St. 2d 6, 12, 238 NE.2d 760, 764 (1968).
40 Id.
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Prior to Yarborough no subsequent encumbrancer (e.g., C) was "jus-
tified" in relying on the failure of the obligatory future advance mort-
gage ". . . to contain or refer to [the mortgagee's) obligation to ad-
vance... 1 the loan proceeds since the mortgage law of Ohio did not
require an obligatory future advance mortgage to contain or refer to such
obligation. As the subsequent encumbrancer was not justified in his re-
liance, his reliance was not, therefore, legally prejudicial. By stating that
a subsequent encumbrancer will be prejudiced by the failure of an ob-
ligatory future advance mortgage to contain or refer to the mortgagee's
obligation to make the loan advances, the Ohio Supreme Court in effect
intimates that such encumbrancers may now justifiably rely on such fail-
ure (i.e., they may justifiably rely on the absence in the mortgage of either
the obligation to make advances or a reference thereto). This means, of
course, that since the subsequent encumbrancer's reliance is justifiable, the
court will not permit the "prejudice" described in the above example to
occur. That is to say, as a result of Yarborough and Akron Savings &
Loan Co., it now appears that an obligatory future advance mortgage
must contain or refer to the mortgagee's obligation to make the loan ad-
vances.
42
B. Reasons For the Notice Requirement
With a few isolated exceptions,43 every jurisdiction which has con-
sidered the issue has refused to hold that an obligatory future advance
mortgage must notify prospective encumbrancers of the mortgagee's ob-
ligation to advance the loan proceeds to the mortgagor.4 In addition,
only a few scholars -have conducted any serious flirtation with the notice
requirement.45 In view of this patent, widespread and longstanding ana-
thema to the notice requirement, one may legitimately question whether
any valid reasons exist which justify its adoption by the Ohio Supreme
Court.
The ostensive reason supporting the notice requirement revolves
41 Wayne Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d 195, 220, 228 N.E.2d 841, 858
(1967).
4 2 The article will not discuss the potential liability of a mortgagee to the mortgagor and
third persons when the mortgagee is not required to advance loan proceeds, but nevertheless
records a mortgage which indicates he is so required.
4 3 E.g., Connecticut. See Collimate, Comparison of Real Property Mortgages and Security
Interests it Chattels To Secure Future Advances, 36 CoNN. B. J. 463 (Student Note 1962);
Recent Decision, Security Law-Mortgage To Secure Future Advances-Are Mortgages Which
Do Not Reveal That They Are To Secure Future Advances Wholly Invalid Against Subsequcnt
Incuabranceers, 31 CONN. B. J. 173 (1957) and cases cited.
4 4 See 1 L. JONES, supra note 4, at § 459; G. OSBORNE, supra note 4, at §120 and cases cited.
45 4 J. KENT, supra note 1, at 176 (emphasis added):
"It is necessary that the (mortgage) agreement, as contained in the record of the lien,
should, however, give all requisite information as to the extent and certainty of the Imortgage]
contract ......
Also see II G. OSBORNE, supra note 4, at 295-96 n. 55.
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around the model prospective encumbrancer: He is the person who has
"justifiably relied" on the absence of an obligation to disburse in a re-
corded future advance mortgage. The notice requirement functions to
protect him by legitimating his reliance.48  Unfortunately, the above rea-
soning completely fails to explain why the Ohio Supreme Court has em-
braced the notice requirement. It fails because it does not in the least ex-
plain why the court should bother to legitimate (i.e., protect) the above
described reliance of the model encumbrancer.
The Yarborough Court did not, of course, articulate the reasons which
prompted it to protect the prospective encumbrancer by sanctioning the
notice requirement (in fact, it did not even dearly articulate the require-
ment itself). In view of this judicial silence, one must conclude that in
its formulation of the notice requirement the Court was motivated more
by its own value judgments' than by strict logic. 48
The court may have concluded that certain considerations of social
utility49 dictate that it is better to compel a mortgagee to bear the burden
of placing the requisite obligatory language in a future advance mort-
gage executed by his debtor than to compel a prospective encumbrancer
to bear the burden of contacting and questioning the mortgagor and mort-
gagee named in the recorded future advance mortgage to ascertain whether
the mortgage is, in fact, obligatory."
It seems undeniable that the burden placed upon a mortgagee by the
notice requirement is not as great (i.e., harsh) as the burden placed upon
a prospective lienor by the failure to adopt the notice requirement. In
short, it is easier and cheaper for mortgagees to insert the requisite ob-
ligatory language in their mortgage instruments than for prospective en-
46 The model prospective encumbrancer is called into being by the Yarborough Court's lan-
guage concerning the subsequent encumbrancer who justifiably relies on the absence of an ob-
ligation to disburse in a recorded obligatory future advance mortgage. At this point, one might
note that the "model prospective encumbrancer" is not a very "normal" encumbrancer. He al-
ways studiously and accurately checks the mortgage records of the County Recorder's Office;
his normal counterparts, on the other hand, often fail to check such records and some of them are
not even aware of their existence. He assumes that all recorded future advance mortgages
viewed by him which do not contain the requisite obligatory language will be treated for pur-
poses of priority exactly like a non-obligatory mortgage - in fact he assumes they are non-
obligatory;, his "normal" counterparts, assuming they have found the path to the Recorder's Of-
fice, will, even after Yarborough, most likely continue to indulge in the opposite assumption. The
failure of a subsequent encumbrancer to function exactly like the model prospective encumbran-
cer may preclude him from reaping the benefits of the notice requirement. See Part V-C infra.
4 7 Holmes, supra note 3, at 467.
48 "The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intentions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow
men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be goverened." 0. Hoi:NES, supra note 16, at 1.
40 For the non-sophisticated law review reader, it is best to point out the phrase "considera-
tions of social utility" means, of course, nothing more than "personal preferences of the court."
r,0 In other words, the court's failure prior to Yarborougb to adopt the notice requirement
in effect compelled each prospective encumbrancer who wished to protect himself to contact
the mortgagee or mortgagor in order to determine whether the recorded future advance mortgage
was obligatory.
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cumbrancers to make the above described inquiries. Considerations of
relative magnitude and cost are given weight by the courts 'because the
holders of future advance mortgages are ordinarily powerful commercial
lending institutions, large insurance companies and other persons of con-
siderable wealth and sophistication while prospective encumbrancers are
likely to be less sophisticated small businessmen on whom the courts will
look with favor and seek to protect e.g., the prospective laborer or mate-
rialman (i.e., mechanic's lienor) 1
Other considerations of social utility which the Yarborough Court may
have considered include the desirability of preventing fraud and the ne-
cessity of maintaining and promoting the integrity of the recording sys-
tem. The landmark Connecticut case of Pettibone v. Griswoldm articu-
lates the role of the notice requirement in preventing fraud. In Pettibone,
the court states:
It is the object of... [the recording] law to prevent fraud ....
... [T]he encumbrance on the property must be so defined as to prevent
the substitution of everything which a fraudulent grantor may devise to
shield himself from the demands of his creditors.
The creditor [intervening lienor] could know nothing from an examina-
tion of the [mortgage] record and must be cast on his debtor for informa-
tion, to the very person who would be least inclined to give it; and succes-
sive obligations, fictitious or actual, might be made, to lock up his land, in
defiance of every claim against him.5
The use of the notice requirement maintains and promotes the integ-
rity of our well-entrenched recording system. In this respect, the re-
cording system is designed to disclose to a prospective encumbrancer all
information necessary to protect his interests and to obviate the need for
such encumbrancer ". . . to make inquiry in pais concerning the liens on
the property of his [prospective) debtor."" It is manifest that this dis-
51 
"Mortgages have never the objects of public sympathy or words of the court Some large
corporations, insurance companies and public carriers particularly feel that they are special ob-
jects of punishment by courts and juries, but, NOT SO! When they were in their swaddling
clothes, courts were taking 'the hide with the hair from money lenders."' Spradling, Legal
Hazards Of Construction Lending, 23 Bus. LAW. 221 (1963).
52 4 Conn. 158, 10 Am. Dec. 106 (1822).
53Id. at 162, 10 Am. Dec. at 107-08.
54 Id. at 162, 10 Am. Dec. at 107. Pettibone also states that mortgage deeds which do not com-
ply with the notice requirement are "... at war with the policy of the recording system." Id. at
162, 10 Am. Dec. at 108. Two of the possible reasons which may have prompted the Yarboroagh
Court to impose the notice requirement [(1) eliminate the need for the prospective encum-
brancer to contact the mortgagor or mortgagee and (2) promote the recording system] are
defeated insofar as the notice requirement provides the mortgage may merely "refer" to the mort-
gagee's obligation to disburse the loan proceeds. If the mortgage in question contains a mere ref-
erence to the mortgagee's obligation, a prospective encumbrancer must still contact the mortga-
gor or mortgagee in order to ascertain that the mortgage is, in fact, obligatory. Moreover, since
the recorded mortgage does not contain the obligation itself, but only a reference thereto, a
prospective encumbrancer does not procure from the recorded mortgage document all informa-
tion "necessary to protect his interests" and he must, therefore, make an inquiry "in pais."
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closure design is at least partially frustrated if the notice requirement is
not adopted - hence one reason which may have motivated the Court to
adopt the requirement.
Each consideration discussed above furnishes a reason which justifies
the imposition of the notice requirement in order to protect the model
intervening encumbrancer. It is submitted that a consideration which
has absolutely nothing to do with protecting the model encumbrancer
may have been the primary factor which influenced the Court to adopt
the requirement. The Court may have adopted the notice requirement in
order to preclude or limit arbitrary actions on the part of powerful mort-
gagees (i.e., to protect mortgagors)." In states which have not adopted
the notice requirement, a mortgagee may, for example, orally obligate
himself to disburse loan proceeds and then pre-emptorily decide, for any
number of reasons, to cease making disbursements. In such an instance,
any action by the mortgagor against the mortgagee may well fail for lack
of proof, inability to prove damages or other reasons. 86 Imposition of the
notice requirement requires mortgagees to "nail themselves down" in the
recorded future advance mortgage. That is, it compels them to openly
obligate themselves to make the disbursements in question. Thus, the
requirement tends from both a legal and a business standpoint to elimi-
nate arbitrary action of the type described above.
If the Yarborough Court imposed a notice requirement to discourage
arbitrary action by mortgagees under future advance mortgages, it will
find some manner to sweep aside the otherwise valid defenses which mort-
gagees will hereafter invoke to excuse their failure to comply with the
requirement. These defenses will now be discussed.
55 Gilmore points out that cases involving abuse of mortgages for future advances "... keep
coming along in numbers just sufficient to keep fresh in judicial mind the ease with which the
future advance device can be exploited by the overreaching mortgagee to crush the impoverished
but no doubt honest debtor." II G. GItI.onB, supra note 4, at 917-18.
56 Gilmore states:
"It is universally held that a contract to lend money will never be specifically en-
forced: Money and Blackacre are at opposite polls. Damages for breach of such a con-
tract are restricted to any additional interest which the borrower may have to pay if he
borrows the money from another source. If the first lender (who has breached its
contract) has agreed to lend at the going rate of interest, and the borrower procures
another loan at the same rate, there will be no damages. If he is unable to procure such a
loan, the reason will be that he is an unsatisfactory financial risk: In ninety-nine cases
out of a hundred, that fact will (if the matter ever comes to litigation) serve to discharge
the first lender from his contractual commitment. Even if the lender is not technically
discharged, the damages the buyer may have suffered in not getting the loan when
he expected it will not be, under standard contract theory, the direct and natural re-
sult of the lender's breach: They will be the result of the borrower's own deteriorated
credit standing and hence not recoverable. The contract to lend money is thus a most
peculiar animal: maybe it is not a contract at all; if it is, it is a contract which may
be breached with impunity."
II G. GILoRE, supra note 4, at 926 [footnotes omitted].
One eminent authority has disputed Gilmore's contention that a lender may, with impunity,
breach his binding commitment to advance mortgage loan proceeds. See Coogan, Intangibles
ar Collateral under the Uniform Commercial Code, 77 HARV. L R. 997, 1031 (1964).
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C. Defenses To The Notice Requirement
As has already been pointed out, the notice requirement is ostensively
imposed to protect the intervening lienor who has relied on the absence
in a recorded future advance mortgage of an obligation to disburse or a
reference thereto. Given this assumption, it necessarily follows that fail-
ure to comply with the notice requirement (i.e., to insert the requisite
obligatory language in the mortgage) should be excusable in those in-
stances where the intervening lienor does not rely on such failure. Three
such instances in which such non-compliance should be excused are dis-
cussed below.
First, an intervening lienor must fail to rely, indeed will be incapable
of relying, on the absence of the requisite obligatory language in a re-
corded future advance mortgage in those instances when he "knows" the
mortgage is obligatory. In such instances the courts should, perhaps, apply
the well-established general rule that a given person is bound not only by
the facts made available to him through recorded documents but also by
unrecorded facts of which he has knowledge.
Of course, the principal problem which courts must cope with in regu-
lating the knowledge defense is articulating the type of knowledge which
will excuse the mortgagee's non-compliance with the notice requirement.
Knowledge of obligatory terms not contained in a recorded future advance
mortgage may be of two types - actual or constructive. The legal effect
of the intervening lienor's possession of one or the other of these types
of knowledge will most likely be determined by two factors, namely:
(1) the extent to which the courts will want to compel future advance
mortgagees to comply with the notice requirement, and (2) the extent to
which the courts will want to protect intervening lienors from their own
failure to make a reasonable inquiry concerning mortgage terms after re-
ceiving facts which would normally dictate an inquiry. If courts decide
either that they should compel strict adherence to the notice requirement
or that intervening lienors should be permitted to "close their eyes" to
facts which dictate further investigation concerning the obligatory nature
of the mortgage, they will hold that failure to comply with the notice re-
quirement is excusable only if the intervening lienor possesses actual
knowledge of the obligatory terms of the mortgage. On the other hand,
if the courts feel that strict adherence to the notice requirement is not es-
sential in every instance, and that the law should require of intervening
lienors at least that inquiry which business prudence dictates in such a
situation (i.e., a reasonable inquiry), then the courts will hold, as they
should, that the mortgagee's failure to comply with the notice require-
ment is excused even though the intervening lienor possesses only con-
structive knowledge of the obligatory terms of the future advance mort-
gage.
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Second, an intervening lienor will not rely on the failure of a recorded
future advance mortgage to contain the requisite obligatory language in
those instances when he does not bother to check the mortgage or the
mortgage records.57  The intervening lienor cannot possibly rely on the
failure of a mortgage to contain certain obligatory language if he has
never examined the mortgage itself.
Third, even if a prospective lienor examines a recorded future ad-
vance mortgage which does not comply with the notice requirement, he
may nevertheless assume that the mortgage will take priority over any lien
thereafter acquired by him. That is, he may not, in fact, rely on the fail-
ure of the mortgage to contain the requisite obligatory language for the
simple reason that he is ignorant of the legal rule which permits him to
so rely.
It seems clear that if the defenses discussed above (particularly the
second and third defenses) are given judicial recognition, they will sub-
stantially narrow the impact of the notice requirement since they will, as
has been pointed out, excuse the mortgagee's failure to comply therewith. 5
Of course, those theoreticians who value legal symmetry above all else
will raise their standard objection to any widening of the notice defenses
- they will point out that the recognition of any additional defense
will constitute an attack upon the integrity of the notice requirement and
that such attacks will eventually subvert the requirement in toto. I dis-
agree. Most future advance mortgagees are commercial lending institu-
tions. These institutions tend to act in an extremely conservative manner
as indeed they should when lending their depositors funds. As a result
they will not decline to place the requisite obligatory language in their
standard mortgage deeds on the mere assumption that an intervening
lienor might not, for any of the reasons discussed above, rely on the fail-
ure of the mortgage to fulfill the notice requirement. In view of this,
it becomes apparent that the defenses will, for the most part, function to
permit courts to render equitable decisions in those relatively few instances
when unsophisticated mortgagees have failed to comply with the notice
requirement and the intervening lienor has not relied on such failure. In
short, the failure of our courts to recognize the notice defenses will more
57 ,,... it has been repeatedly stated that in practice, lenders seldom check public records
for claims on the borrower's assets." Comment, supra note 5, at 143. Of course, if the inter-
vening lienor has examined the future advance mortgage prior to its recordation, his failure to
examine the mortgage as recorded cannot be invoked by the mortgagee to excuse his failure
to comply with the notice requirement.
UsTechnically the mortgagee is not charged by the law to comply with the notice require-
ment. In this regard, the requirement is satisfied whenever the mortgage itself contains the
requisite obligatory language irrespective of whether the mortgagee or the mortgagor inserted
such language. However, from a practical standpoint, the mortgagee is saddled with the require-
ment since it is he who will be penalized if the requirement is not met Also, while the mortgage
deed is technically the mortgagor's document, the deed is nearly always drafted by the mortga-
gee.
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likely create a trap for the unwary mortgagee than provide a needed
safeguard for the average intervening lienor.
D. Viability of the Notice Defenses
As has been pointed out, the notice defenses "make sense" only if we
assume the notice requirement was imposed, as the Yarborough opinion
intimates, to protect the reliance of the intervening lienor. If the notice
requirement was actually imposed, as I believe, to discourage arbitrary ac-
tion by future advance mortgagees, Ohio courts will reject the notice de-
fenses. This rejection will assume one of two forms. First, the courts
might candidly acknowledge the "real reason" which motivated the im-
position of the notice requirement (i.e., their "gut" feeling that the re-
quirement would compel future advance mortgagees to act less arbitrar-
ily). If such acknowledgment is made, the courts should then forth-
rightly explain that they will not permit future advance mortgagees to
invoke the notice defenses since such defenses are incompatible with the
rationale which supports the notice requirement. Or, second, the courts
might continue to pretend the notice requirement is designed to protect
the -reliance of the intervening lienor. However, if they should continue
to engage in such pretension, they will have to create judicial fictions for
the sole purpose of destroying the notice defenses.
Given the present obscuristic qualities of recent Ohio Supreme Court
decisions relating to mortgage law, -it seems likely any rejection of the no-
tice defenses will assume the second form. Accordingly, this article will
next touch upon some of the judicial devices which the courts may em-
brace in order to negate or limit what might otherwise be the forceful
impact of the notice defenses.
The device which courts will employ to negate or limit the scope of
the notice defenses will depend upon which of the defenses is invoked.
If the first notice defense is invoked - mortgagee asserts that the inter-
vening lienor "knew" of the obligatory nature of the mortgage - the
court will likely limit this defense to those instances when the interven-
ing lienor possesses actual as distinguished from constructive knowledge
of the obligatory loan advancements. Of course, all doubts regarding the
intervening lienor's absence of knowledge will be resolved in his favor.
If the second notice defense is invoked - the intervening lienor did
not check the mortgage records and hence did not rely upon the failure
of the mortgage to contain the requisite obligatory language - the courts
will negate this defense 'by invoking the hallowed rule that an intervening
lienor, like all other persons, is automatically charged by the law with
"knowledge" of all recorded documents and their contents. The courts
can then freely take the next dubious step by ruling that since the inter-
vening lienor is charged by the law with knowledge of the contents of the
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recorded future advance mortgage, the mortgagee cannot be permitted to
invoke the second defense, a defense which allegedly ignores the force
of the recording statutes.
As will be recalled, the third notice defense will be invoked in those
instances when an intervening lienor "knows" of the mortgage but fails
to rely on its failure to contain the requisite obligatory language be-
cause, for example, the intervening lienor is ignorant of the legal rule
which permits him to so rely. This third defense will be the easiest de-
fense to "torpedo." The courts need only reason as follows:
It is the law in Ohio that an intervening lienor is permitted to rely on
the failure of a recorded future advance mortgage to contain the requisite
obligatory language. It is also the law in Ohio that everyone is conclu-
sively presumed to know the law. Thus, the intervening lienor is conclu-
sively presumed to have known that he was permitted by our law to rely on
the failure of the mortgage to contain the requisite obligatory language.
In view of this conclusive presumption, the mortgagee cannot be permitted
to invoke a defense which is predicated upon the intervening lienor's ig-
norance of the law. [Hypothetical Opinion].
The most cursory analysis of the reasons which support the "conclu-
sive presumption" regarding one's knowledge of the law reveals, of
course, that a court's use of this presumption to negate the third notice de-
fense will be completely devoid of merit. In this regard, when a court
states that everyone is conclusively presumed to know the law, it is merely
stating that ignorance of the law cannot be invoked by a person to excuse
illegal action taken by him. Thus, the conclusive presumption as to
knowledge of the law is predicated upon the assumption that evasion
of the law would be facilitated and the successful administration of justice
would be defeated if defendants accused of legal wrongs could success-
fully plead plaintiff's ignorance of the illegality of their acts. It is clear
that a court's recognition of the third notice defense would not constitute
an attack upon the assumption discussed above since such defense would
not impede the successful administration of justice. Thus, one must con-
clude that the presumption, if invoked, will constitute merely a handy de-
vice used by the courts to squelch the third notice defense.
To summarize, if the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the notice require-
ment to protect the intervening lienor who actually relies on the failure
of a recorded future advance mortgage to contain the requisite obliga-
tory language, it will permit invocation of the three notice defenses since
none of these defenses undermine the reasons which gave birth to the
notice requirement. On the other hand, if the court adopted the require-
ment to limit arbitrary action by mortgagees it will either severely limit
or refuse to permit the invocation of the notice defenses. The manner in
which the court will accomplish this goal cannot be predicted. Hope-
fully, in this event, the court will candidly acknowledge that the notice
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defenses will not be recognized since they infringe upon the basis of the
notice requirement (i.e., a need to limit arbitrary action by mortgagees).
If the court lacks candor, it will limit the first defense by requiring actual
knowledge of the lender's obligation to disburse and will destroy the sec-
ond and third defenses by invoking inappropriate conclusive presumptions
regarding one's knowledge of the contents of recorded documents and
one's knowledge of the law.
VI. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT - THE PRIORITY PROBLEM
Thus far, in addition to the debt concept, this article has discussed (1)
factors which may have prompted the Yarborough Court to adopt the no-
tice requirement, (2) the nature of the requirement and (3) possible de-
fenses which a mortgagee may invoke to excuse his failure to comply
with the requirement. At this point, this article will discuss the most
crucial question which arises in connection with the notice requirement:
What legal consequences attach to the failure of a future advance mort-
gagee -to refer to or to set forth in his mortgage his obligation to disburse
the mortgage -loan proceeds to the mortgagor? This is merely one man-
ner of asking: What rules of priority apply to obligatory loan disburse-
ments made by a future advance mortgagee who has not complied with
the notice requirement? The Yarborough opinion completely fails to an-
swer this important question.
It appears the Ohio Supreme Court is free to adopt one of three
priority rules when an obligatory future advance mortgage does not con-
tain or refer to the mortgagee's obligation to disburse:
1. All obligatory disbursements made by a future advance mortgagee
take priority over an intervening lien which attaches to the mortgaged
real estate even though some of such disbursements are made subsequent
to the time of attachment of the intervening lien.
2. All obligatory disbursements made by a future advance mortgagee
take priority over an intervening lien to the extent that such disburse-
ments are made prior to the time when -the future advance mortgagee ac-
quires constructive knowledge of such lien.
3. All obligatory disbursements made by a future advance mortgagee
take priority over an intervening lien to the extent that such disburse-
ments are made prior -to the time when the future advance mortgagee ac-
quires actual knowledge of such lien.
It seems dear the Ohio Supreme Court will reject the first priority
rule since its adoption of such rule would render the notice requirement
nugatory. That is, under the first rule, no penalty attaches to a mort-
gagee's failure to comply with the requirement. Disbursements made by
him are for purposes of priority treated exactly like disbursements made
by a mortgagee who has complied with the requirement. Clearly, such a
mockery of the requirement will not be tolerated by the court.
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The second priority rule is identical to the priority rule now applied by
the Ohio Supreme Court to optional disbursements made by a future ad-
vance mortgagee. Because of the nature of "constructive knowledge" a
mortgagee will nearly always possess constructive knowledge of an inter-
vening lien the moment it attaches to the mortgaged real estate.59 Thus,
if the court adopts the second priority rule, obligatory future advances
made pursuant to a mortgage which does not comply with the notice re-
quirement will, in most instances, take priority only if they are made
prior to the time the intervening lien attaches. This rule is extremely
harsh.60 Hopefully therefore, it will be rejected by the Supreme Court.
Otherwise, the rule will result in the following non-sequitur: All obliga-
tory disbursements made after any intervening lien attaches to the mort-
gaged real estate will be treated for purposes of priority exactly as if they
were optional disbursements. Clearly, such treatment is justified neither
by economic considerations or by legal logic.
If the Supreme Court insists upon adopting the notice requirement, it
should adopt the third priority rule. This rule which requires actual
knowledge by the future advance mortgagee of the intervening lien best
harmonizes the conflicting interests of the mortgagee and the intervening
lienor.61 For purposes of priority, it treats obligatory disbursements made
after an intervening lien attaches to the mortgaged real estate exactly like
the majority of jurisdictions (but not Ohio) treat optional disbursements
made after an intervening lien attaches to the mortgaged real estate.
A careful consideration of either of the two priority rules which the
notice requirement is likely to invoke dictates the conclusion that the no-
tice requirement will, at best, compel Ohio courts to treat obligatory fu-
ture advances like most states treat optional future advances. At worst,
the requirement will compel Ohio courts to treat obligatory future ad-
vances like a few states, including Ohio, treat optional future advances.
It is obvious that future advance mortgagees will be unhappy with
59 See note 10, supra.
6 0 In fact the rule is not applied in a majority of jurisdictions even to regulate priority be-
tween intervening lienors and optional disbursements made by a mortgagee.
6 1 Osborne has set forth arguments in support of the assertion that an optional advance mort-
gagee should take priority over all intervening liens until he acquires actual knowledge of such
liens. These arguments also support the third priority rule discussed above. He states:
"The arguments for the majority view are that the operation of the recording laws are
prospective, not retrospective, and therefore should constitute no notice to the first
mortgagee who should not have to keep on examining records after he has satisfied all
of the laws requirements as to his own mortgage; that it is unjust for a man to lose his
security by the mere registration of a subsequent lien, i.e., by no act of his own; that as
a practical matter the majority rule is better calculated to subserve the business conven-
ience which called the practice into being, that this especially true where continuous
dealings with frequent advances are contemplated; that the hardship on the first mort-
gagee through having to make new examinations of title before each later advance,
added to these considerations, more than balance any hardship on the later encum-
brancer...."
G. OSBORN, supra note 4, at 293-94 [foomotes omitted].
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either priority rule since each represents a formidable inroad upon the
priority bastion heretofore accorded future advance mortgagees in Ohio.
However, since in the "thinking" of the Yarborough Court legitimate
reasons in support of the notice requirement exist, it is probable that the
requirement, though presently supported only by way of dicta, will with-
stand any assaults launched against it by zealous mortgagees.
VII. DRAFTING THE FUTuRE ADVANCE MORTGAGE
Many Ohio lenders have long drafted as purchase-money mortgages
those mortgages which contemplate future advances (i.e., they have used a
mortgage which names a given sum as a present loan when in fact the
sum merely represents the total amount which the mortgagee will eventu-
ally advance to the mortgagor). This portion of .the article discusses the
manner in which the notice requirement will affect the practice of dis-
guising a future advance mortgage as a purchase-money mortgage.
As the reader will recall, the notice requirement is theoretically im-
posed to protect the intervening lienor who 'has relied on the absence in
a recorded future advance mortgage of an obligation to disburse. Thus,
in those instances when a future advance mortgage is drafted as a pur-
chase-money mortgage, an enterprising mortgagee might make the follow-
ing argument. Reliance on the absence of an obligation to disburse loan
funds can arise only in those instances when the mortgage indicates to the
intervening lienor that future disbursements are contemplated (i.e., when
the future advance mortgage is drafted as such). When a future advance
mortgage is drafted as a purchase-money mortgage, the intervening lienor
assumes quite naturally that no future advances are contemplated for the
simple reason that a purchase-money mortgage has been given to secure a
loan advance which has already occurred. If the intervening lienor who
reads a future advance mortgage which has been drafted as a purchase-
money mortgage assumes that no future loan advances are contemplated,
he obviously does not rely on the absence 'in such mortgage of an obliga-
tion to -disburse. Since -the intervening lienor does not rely on the absence
of an obligation to disburse, no court need invoke the notice requirement
to protect a reliance which does not exist. Because the notice requirement
is not invoked, the "normal" priority rule will govern the obligatory dis-
bursements made under the mortgage, namely all disbursements will be
accorded priority from the date of the recording of the requisite future
advance mortgage even though it is drafted as a purchase-money mort-
gage.
Of course, if Ohio courts accept the strict but absurd logic inherent in
the purchase-money mortgage defense, they will be confronted with the
following rather embarrassing anomaly. Disbursements made by a mort-
gagee under an obligatory future advance mortgage which is drafted as
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such but which does not include the requisite obligatory language will be
treated more harshly for purposes of ascertaining priority than will dis-
bursements made by a mortgagee under an obligatory future advance
mortgage even though such mortgagee has deliberately distorted the facts
and perverted the recording system by drafting his future advance mort-
gage as a purchase-money mortgage. The presence of the anomaly dic-
tates one conclusion - Ohio courts will reject the purchase-money mort-
gage defense and will therefore require all future advance mortgages to
be drafted as such.62 To those who have not been schooled in the mys-
terious science of the law, the statement that Ohio courts will not permit
a future advance mortgage to be drafted as a purchase-money mortgage
must indeed seem unexceptional. However, those familiar with the
vagaries of the law and, in particular, mortgage law, will at once appre-
ciate and recognize the radical deviation of the new requirement from the
standard common law rule which has long governed the use of purchase-
money mortgage forms in connection with future advance loans.
Most jurisdictions have consistently held that a future advance mort-
gage drafted as a purchase-money mortgage is valid not only between the
parties, but is also valid against subsequent encumbrances." As one com-
mentator points out, the courts have held ". . . that the deception of
creditors and encumbrancers [which a future advance mortgage drafted
as a purchase-money mortgage makes possible] can be overlooked be-
cause .. . [creditors and subsequent encumbrancers] do or should expect
to reach the mortgaged property only after the expressed maximum claim
[i.e., the face amount of the mortgage] is satisfied. 'When they find out
the truth, i.e., that there is more of the property unencumbered than they
thought, they are just that much better off than they expected to be and
should have no complaint."' 5
To date, only a small handful of jurisdictions have dared to require
62 In holding that Ohio mortgages must indicate on their face whether future advances are
contemplated, our courts will bring mortgage law "into line" with the Uniform Commercial
Code which appears to require an express provision for future advances in security agreements
if such advances will, in fact, be made. UCC 9-204(5); OHIo REVISED CODE ANN. §1309.15(E)
(Page 1962). II G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 932-33.
It should be pointed out that if a secured party under a future advance loan elects to file a
financing statement instead of the security agreement, nothing contained therein will indicate
to a prospective encumbrancer that future advances are contemplated. Since most secured parties
file financing statements instead of security agreements the position of a prospective encumbran-
cer with respect to personal property is, in most states, identical with his position with respect
to real property when a future advance mortgage is drafted as a purchase-money mortgage.
63 "A clear mind might determine at once what the law ought to be, but actual inspection
alone can determine what the law is." T. WALKER, INTRODUCrION AMERICAN LAW 19 (1845).
6 4 Shirras v. Craig, 7 Cranch (11 U.S.), 34, 3 L. Ed. 260 (1812), opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, is the leading case. Also see the cases cited in 11 G. GLENN, supra note 4, at 1598-1601;
G. OSBORNE, supra note 4, at 281-284; 9 G. THOM7SON, supra note 4, at §4749, 5 R. TIFFANY,
supra note 4, at 467-68.
65 G. OSBORNE, supra note 4, at 282-83.
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mortgagees to draft a future advance mortgage as such 0 Quite natur-
ally, these jurisdictions have been strongly impressed with the obvious
dangers inherent in the use of future advance mortgages drafted as pur-
chase-money mortgages (e.g., misrepresentation of the nature and size of
the mortgagor's debt).67 As a result, they require either by statute or
judicial decision a full disclosure of the nature of the secured indebted-
ness. 8  Many benefits flow from such a disclosure. For example, the
disclosure: (1) tends to actively and forcefully discourage a creditor's
temptation to misrepresent the worth of his assets [This temptation most
certainly has no need of the "shot in the arm" given it by a legal rule
which sanctions the drafting of a future advance mortgage as a purchase-
money mortgage]; (2) relieves subsequent creditors and encumbrancers
of the concern that the incumbrance of the mortgage might be other than
stated therein; (3) relieves prospective creditors and lienors of the burden
of contacting either the lender or the debtor to ascertain the true nature
of the debt incurred by the debtor; and (4) promotes the integrity of the
recording system. 9
Given the many evils inherent in 'the practice of drafting future ad-
vance mortgages as purchase-money mortgages, it is difficult to under-
stand why so many cogrts have so consistently sanctioned the practice.
Clearly it is not dictated by any significant legal or business considerations
and it fully deserves the burial which Yarborough appears, by implica-
tion, to have given it.
Assuming from the above that Yarborough, by implication, justifiably
requires all future advance mortgages to be drafted as such, Ohio courts
will eventually be compelled to answer the following question: What
06 Connecticut, Georgia, Maryland and New Hampshire. See discussion in G. OSBORNE,
supra note 4, at §122. The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated:
"It is always better, however, for obvious reasons, that the mortgage should be drawn
so as to show the true object of the transaction, for suspicion is engendered by misrep-
resentation but disarmed by a statement of the truth." Scofield Implement Co. v. Mina
Farm Grain Assn., 31 N. Dak. 605, 154 N.W. 527, 528 (1915).
07 REcENr DECISION, supra note 43, at 175. Osborne, citing cases, states that 'WVhen
... [a future advance mortgage is drafted as a purchase-money mortgage) there is a false rep-
resentation of fact which is in itself, on well established rules, some evidence of actual fraud."
G. OSBORNE, supra note 4, at §116.
68 Arkansas: Patterson v. Ogles, 152 Ark. 395, 238 S.W., 598 (1922); Connecticut: Petti-
bone v. Griswold, 4 Conn. 158, 10 Am. Dec. 106 (1822); Matz v. Arick, 76 Conn. 388, 56
A. 630 (1904); Sadd v. Heim, 143 Conn. 582, 124 A.2d 522 (1956); Georgia: Allen v. Lathrop,
46 Ga. 134 (1872); Maryland: MD. CODE PUB. GEN. LAws, 1951 (Supp. 1956), Art, 66,
§2; Groh v. Cohen, 158 Md. 638, 149 A. 459 (1930); Baltimore High Grade Brick Co. v.
Amos, 95 Md. 571, 52 A. 583, 53 A. 148 (1902); New Hampshire: .H. REVISED STATS. ANN.
(1955) C. 479, §3, 4, 5. Cf. 1949 REV. STAT. CoNN., §7279 which provides: "Any person
who shall loan money upon a note secured by mortgage upon personal property, in which the sum
of money loaned is stated to be greater than the amount actually loaned... shall be fined not
more than fifty dollars or imprisoned not more than three months or both; and, the mortgage
and note secured thereby shall be void." For an interesting case which resulted in a strict appli-
cation of §7279 see In Re Metal Products Co. v. Weiss, 276 F. 2d 701 (2d Cir., 1960).
o9 RECENT DEIaSIoN, supra note 43, at 175-76.
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penalty should be levied upon a mortgagee who drafts a future advance
mortgage as a purchase-money mortgage?70  This question can best be
answered by examining the penalties levied in other jurisdictions.
With one exception, every jurisdiction which prohibits the drafting of
a future advance mortgage as a purchase-money mortgage levies a severe
penalty upon any future advance mortgagee who utilizes the form of a
purchase-money mortgage. In this regard, these jurisdictions hold that a
disguised future advance mortgage is completely invalid as against sub-
sequent lienors. These jurisdictions reason that a future advance mort-
gage drafted as a purchase-money mortgage ". . . does not tell the truth;
therefore, it is not entitled to recordation and should not be held effec-
tive against encumbrancers subsequent in time." 71  Scholars who have
carefully studied the problem have reached identical conclusions. 2
One jurisdiction which prohibits the drafting of future advance mort-
gages as purchase-money mortgages (Connecticut) has imposed a penalty
which substantially deviates from the majority penalty. In the leading case
of Matz v. Arick, 3 the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that all advances
made under an obligatory future advance mortgage drafted as a purchase-
money mortgage take priority over subsequent encumbrancers to the ex-
tent that such advances are made prior to the time the subsequent en-
cumbrances attach to the mortgaged premises. Thus, to the extent that
such advances are not made prior to the time the subsequent encum-
brances attach to the premises, then such advances do not acquire priority
over such encumbrances. As one authority has aptly remarked:
*.. [Matz] contains all of the disadvantages and none of the advantages
of both the majority [future advance mortgage may be drafted as a pur-
chase-money mortgage] and minority [future advance mortgage must be
drafted as such] positions insofar as a defective mortgage capable of de-
ception was held valid for the present advancement, and the practice of
concealing assets was not prevented, or even discouraged. 74
The priority rule (i.e., penalty) enunciated in Matz has also been
soundly and justifiably criticized by other authorities.7 5 Consequently, it
70 For one discussion of this question see G. OSBORNE, supra note 4, at 288-290.
7 1 RECENT DECISION, supra note 43, at 176.
72 E.g., Osborne.
"A third rationale (for prohibiting the drafting of a future advance mortgage as a
purchase-money mortgage) is that it is necessary in order to prevent the device from
being used as a vehicle of fraudulent or at least preferential arrangements. . . . If
this were the reason for the doctrine it would seem that the concealed... mortgages
for future advances should be invalidated completely rather than merely ending their
priority as to later advances." G. OSBORNE, supra note 4, at 290-91.
73 76 Conn. 388, 56 A. 630 (1904).
74 REcENT DEcIsIoN, supra note 43, at 178.
7 5 Hewitt, The Rule is Matz v. Arick, 2 CONN. B. J. 237 (1928); Goldman, Formation of
Construction Loan Mfortgage Deeds, 15 CONN. B. J. 240 (1941).
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is submitted that Ohio courts should, when confronted with the issue, re-
ject the Matz penalty in favor of the sounder majority penalty.
VIII. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT AND THE OPEN-END
MORTGAGE
Many lenders view the statutory open-end mortgage as a vehicle which
negates the need to comply with the notice requirement. Accordingly, the
open-end mortgage statute should be examined to ascertain whether this
view has merit.
Section 5301.232 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that a mortgage
will constitute an open-end statutory mortgage if it: (1) indicates in
substance or effect that it secures future loan advances, if any, made by
the mortgagee to the mortgagor; (2) states the maximum amount of
unpaid loan indebtedness, exclusive of any interest thereon, which may
be outstanding thereunder at any time; (3) contains at the beginning there-
of the words "OPEN-END MORTGAGE." Section 5301.232 also pro-
vides that if a mortgage, as drafted, meets all of the requirements set forth
therein, all obligatory future advances made under such mortgage take
priority over all intervening liens which attach to the mortgaged premises
after the mortgage is recorded. It should be noted that the statute no-
where requires the statutory open-end mortgage, if it is obligatory, to con-
tain or refer to the mortgagee's obligation to disburse to the mortgagor
the loan proceeds. In spite of this statutory silence, a prudent lender must
ask himself: Can the notice requirement which is articulated in Yarborough
and which the Supreme Court apparently made applicable to all types of
obligatory future advance mortgages existing when the Yarborough dispute
arose be extended to the statutory open-end mortgage even though the
statutory authority for such a mortgage followed the Yarborough dispute?
Given the intricacies of Ohio mortgage law and the Ohio Supreme Court's
apparent hostility to mortgagees as well as its probable hostility to statu-
tory as distinguished from judge-made law,70 the question is not as open
and shut as one might initially surmise.
Since Section 5301.232 neither requires nor intimates that an obliga-
tory statutory open-end future advance mortgage must contain or refer
to the mortgagee's obligation to disburse to the mortgagor the face
amount of the mortgage, it is reasonable and nearly mandatory that one
conclude all obligatory advances under a statutory open-end mortgage
take priority from the date of such mortgage's recordation even though
it does not contain or refer to the mortgagee's obligation. However, a
zealous Ohio Supreme Court would experience no appreciable difficulty
in "grafting" the notice requirement onto the statutory open-end mort-
gage. For example, the court might reason by analogy as follows:
76 Schaefer, supra note 8, at 18 (footnotes omitted).
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Section 5301.23 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that mortgages take
effect from the time they are delivered to the recorder for record. In spite
of the plain meaning of Section 5301.23, this court has stated that a future
advance mortgage and the disbursements made thereunder do not take ef-
fect (i.e., possess priority) from the time such mortgage is delivered to the
recorder for record unless such mortgage is obligatory and the requisite
obligatory language is set forth or referred to therein. Wayne Building
& Loan Co. v. Yarborough, 11 Ohio St. 2d, 195, 228 N.E.2d 841
(1967). If this court can provide that certain case law prerequisites must
be met (i.e., the notice requirement must be complied with) before a mort-
gagee is entitled to invoke the priority rule of Section 5301.23, it neces-
sarily follows that this court can likewise provide that a mortgagee under
an obligatory statutory open-end mortgage must comply with the same case
law prerequisites before he will be entitled to invoke the priority rule set
forth in the open-end mortgage statute. [Hypothetical Opinion].
Of course, the conclusion set forth in the preceding hypothetical opin-
ion does not "necessarily follow" at all since -the analogy set forth therein
is strained at best. It is logical and proper to assert that a court may re-
quire a common law mortgage (i.e., a non-statutory mortgage) to meet a
given prerequisite (e.g., the notice requirement) before it will be en-
titled to the benefits of the priority rule set forth in the recording statute,
§ 5301.23. This is logical and proper since courts have always judicially
defined the attributes a common-law instrument must possess in order to
constitute a mortgage which is entitled to the protection of the recording
statutes. However, it is quite another matter to assert that a court may
validly impose an additional requirement (e.g., the notice requirement)
upon a statutory form of mortgage, where the attributes are defined by
the legislature, before such mortgage is entitled to the priority benefits
granted by the statute to such mortgage. In view of this, 'it is submitted
the Ohio Supreme Court should restrain any temptation it might have to
extend the notice requirement to statutory open-end mortgages.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
A. Summary
The Yarborough opinion, which may be aptly characterized as a legal
jigsaw puzzle, is dominated by a discusssion of two concepts: (1) the
concept that a mortgage secures repayment of a debt (the "debt con-
cept"); and (2) the concept that an obligatory future advance mortgage
should notify perspective lienors of the mortgagee's obligation to disburse
to the mortgagor the face amount of the mortgage loan (the "notice
concept").
History explains the relationship between the debt concept and the
future advance mortgage. Originally, a mortgage could not exist unless
it secured payment of a pre-existing debt. Thus, when lenders began to
employ future advance mortgages, no mortgage technically existed since
each such mortgage, when recorded, did not secure payment of a debt.
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Courts which were hospitable to future advance mortgages, traveled two
routes to avoid the snare of the debt concept. Those courts which sought
to harness the debt concept to the future advance mortgage adopted the
relation back doctrine. Under this doctrine, courts held that each obliga-
tory loan advance when made by the mortgagee related back to the date
the future advance mortgage was recorded and thus such mortgage ob-
viously secured repayment of a debt. Other courts were somewhat more
sophisticated and sought to eliminate the debt concept insofar as it per-
tained to the future advance mortgage. These courts held that under an
obligatory future advance mortgage the mortgagor's obligation to repay
all amounts disbursed to him is the legal equivalent of the debt concept
and as such it replaced the debt concept. By employing the relation back
doctrine or the obligation doctrine, the courts insured that, for purposes
of priority, obligatory -future advance mortgages (which did not secure a
debt when recorded) were treated exactly like purchase-money mort-
gages (which did secure a debt when recorded).
The second concept discussed in Yarborough is not technically a con-
cept. It is a requirement - the requirement that an obligatory future ad-
vance mortgage notify perspective lienors of the mortgagee's obligation
to disburse to the mortgagor the face amount of the mortgage loan. This
requirement 'has 'been rejected by most courts as well as scholars who
have studied it closely. Yarborough strongly intimates that the notice re-
quirement is imposed to protect an intervening lienor who has relied on
the absence in a recorded future advance mortgage of an obligation to dis-
burse. This explanation does not explain since no reason is given as to
why a court should protect the intervening lienor's reliance. To ascer-
tain the real reason for -the Supreme Court's adoption of the notice re-
quirement, one must look beyond the "reliance" reason since it may well
be merely a makeweight.
Considerations relating to the nature of the relationship between mort-
gagees, mortgagors and intervening lienors may have prompted the Yar-
borough Court to sanction the notice requirement. For example, the
court may have felt that: (1) it is fair to impose the notice requirement
upon mortgagees since it is easier and cheaper for them to comply with
such requirement than for intervening lienors to contact the mortgagor
and the mortgagee in order to ascertain whether the mortgage is obliga-
tory (such contact would be necessitated only if the notice requirement
was not imposed); and (2) the notice requirement tends to prevent fraud.
The Yarborough Court may have adopted the notice requirement in
the belief that the requirement would strengthen our recording system.
When other factors which may -have prompted the Court to adopt the re-
quirement are considered, this factor does not seem particularly potent.
It is submitted the prime reason the Yarborough Court adopted the
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notice requirement can be found in its desire to preclude or limit arbitrary
and unlawful action of powerful mortgagees. The notice requirement
compels each mortgagee to "nail himself down" in the mortgage instru-
ment. Thus it tends to reduce the vast bargaining disparity which nor-
mally exists between mortgagee and mortgagor.
If the notice requirement was imposed to protect the reliance of inter-
vening lienors on the absence in a future advance mortgage of the req-
uisite obligatory language, three instances will exist when the mortgagee's
failure to comply with the requirement might be excused. These instances
will occur when the intervening lienor: (1) knows the mortgage is ob-
ligatory, (2) fails to examine the mortgage in question or (3) is ignorant
of the legal rule which permits him to rely on the absence in the mort-
gage of an obligation to disburse.
If the notice requirement was imposed not to protect the reliance of
the intervening lienor, but to discourage arbitrary action on the part of
mortgagees, the courts will find methods of destroying or limiting the
scope of the notice defenses. The destruction or limitation of these de-
fenses will assume one of two forms. Either the courts will candidly ac-
knowledge the real reason which motivated the imposition of the notice
requirement and then explain they cannot permit mortgagees to invoke
notice defenses which are incompatible with such reason. Or, on the
other hand, the courts will continue to pretend the notice requirement is
designed to protect the reliance of the intervening lienor and at the same
time they will create devices to destroy or limit the scope of the notice de-
fenses.
The Ohio Supreme Court is likely to adopt one of two priority rules
with respect to loan advancements made under a future advance mortgage
which does not contain the requisite obligatory language. Under the first
rule, all obligatory advances made by a mortgagee will take priority
over intervening liens to the extent that such advances are made prior to
the time when the mortgagee acquires constructive knowledge of the in-
tervening liens. Under the second rule, all obligatory advancements
made by the mortgagee will take priority over intervening liens to the ex-
tent that such advancements are made prior to the time when the mort-
gagee acquires actual knowledge of the intervening liens. The first rule
is extremely harsh and should be rejected in favor of the second rule
which best harmonizes the conflicting interests of the mortgagee and the
intervening lienor.
A desirable byproduct of the notice requirement is the requirement
that all future advance mortgages be drafted as such and not as purchase-
money mortgages as has often been the practice in the past. Although
only a few jurisdictions require future advance mortgages to be drafted
as such, the Yarborough Court is to be commended for structuring its de-
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cision in a manner which will logically compel it and other Ohio courts to
eventually adopt this requirement. Ohio courts may choose to impose one
of two penalties upon a mortgagee who drafts a future advance mortgage
as a purchase-money mortgage. They can hold, as do most jurisdictions
which prohibit such action, that a disguised future advance mortgage is
completely invalid as against subsequent lienors. Or, they can hold, as
does one jurisdiction, -that only those advances which are made subse-
quent to the attachment of the intervening lien are subsequent in priority
to such lien. It is 'hoped that Ohio courts will adopt the first penalty.
Many lenders feel that a mortgagee under a statutory open-end mort-
gage need not comply with the notice .requirement since the open-end
statute nowhere requires the insertion in the mortgage of the requisite ob-
ligatory language. Only time will tell whether this view is correct. In
this regard, Ohio courts should, for a number of reasons, resist any temp-
tation which they might possess to graft the "judicially created" notice
requirement onto the "legislatively created" open-end mortgage.
B. Conclusion
For the most part, Yarborough is a desirable development to the ex-
tent, and only to the extent, that it will compel the bench, bar and the
financial community ,to critically re-examine and re-assess doctrines of
mortgage law which have reigned without significant challenge for over
a century. Because of the immense commercial utility of the future ad-
vance mortgage, and because each judicial decision involving such a mort-
gage is the potential progenitor of many future decisions, each judicial
re-examination and re-assessment of the rules governing such mortgages
must be conducted with the greatest care. Each such re-examination and
re-assessment, as well as any reformulation of the rules governing future
advance mortgages will be governed by one or an amalgamation of the
following three basic policies.
The first policy which a court may wish to implement in cases which
involve future advance mortgages is the adoption of that rule or those
rules which will result in awarding priority between the litigants ".. . on
the basis of the fairest solution."77 One eminent scholar has openly ap-
proved such a policy. He states:
Only a very wise or a very foolish man would be willing to state, cate-
gorically, where truth lies [in the law of future advance mortgages] and
to propose a rule for application in all possible situations. There is, then,
much to be said for having no rule at all, or only a make-believe rule, and
for letting the judges decide: judges are not necessarily wiser than other
people, but they are paid to decide things.78
7 7 Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lending Under The Uniform Com rzerical Code,
35 U. CHI. I. Rav. 128, 140 (1967).
781 I G. GILMORE, supra note 4, at 930.
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Clearly, Ohio courts must avoid any flirtation with this first policy
since it constitutes a negation of the rule of law (i.e., it fosters decisions
based upon the personal preferences of the judge instead of upon pre-
existing, ascertainable rules) 79 and adds uncertainty to an area of the law
where the need for stability is acute. The first policy also might encour-
age arbitrariness on the part of the judiciary. To the extent that it does,
such arbitrariness will eventually impair future advance lending and, thus,
will in turn and in time, equally harm both borrower and lender, as well
as the public. Hence, the first policy should be rejected.
The second policy consists of the adoption of those rules which will
loosen the future advance mortgagee's grip upon the mortgaged property.
This policy is based upon the assumption ".... that secured credit is basi-
cally to be avoided since secured lenders [i.e., mortgagees] already possess
too much power over the economically disadvantaged borrowers ... "80
Given the multitude of economically vital entreprenurial activities which
are supported by funds advanced under future advance mortgages, it is
manifest that Ohio courts should reject any temptation to adopt the second
policy.
The third policy consists of adopting those rules which most promote
secured future advance lending. This policy is based upon the assump-
tion ". . . that the future advances lending device [i.e., the future advance
mortgagel is basically a beneficial mechanism which promotes the in-
fusion of capital -into business enterprises which otherwise could not ex-
ist."' It is submitted that Ohio courts should, for the most part, adopt the
third policy.8 If they do, they will openly embrace the theory that the
mortgagor's obligation under an obligatory future advance mortgage to
repay to the mortgagee all loan proceeds advanced to him is the legal
equivalent of the debt concept. They will also, if they adopt the third
policy, reject the notice requirement. If the requirement is adopted, they
79 Those who advocate judicial adoption of the first policy would do well to heed Lord
Mansfield's statement:
"In all mercantile transactions the great object should be certainty .. ." Vallejo v.
Wheeler, 1 Cowp. 143, 153, 98 Eng. Rep. 1017 (1774).
When I state that judicial decisions should be based upon "pre-existing, ascertainable rules"
I do not mean to imply that judges do not and should not "legislate law" since I, like Justice
Cardozo ".... take judge-made law as one of the existing [and necessary] realities of life." B.
CARozo, supra note 16, at 10. I do mean to imply, however, that judges should, in the words
of Justice Holmes, legislate "... only interstitially . Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 221 (1916).
8 0 Comment, supra note 77, at 140.
81Id.
82 If Ohio courts adopt the third policy, which at the present does not seem likely, they will
return to the position assumed by their mid 19th century predecessors who did much to promote
the use of future advance mortgages. See e.g., Kramer v. Bank, 15 Ohio 253 (1846); Hurd
v. Robinson, 11 Ohio St. 232 (1860). One early commentator described Hurd as the leading
case ". .. which has been the foundation of much of the American law in favor of relaxing
[future advance] .. .mortgages." Thompson, What Description Of the Debt Is Sufficient
In A Recorded Mortgage, 44 CENr. L.J. 490, 494 (1897).
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will (a) permit the invocation of the notice defenses, (b) adopt the "third
priority rule" discussed herein and (c) hold the requirement inapplicable
to statutory open-end mortgages.
The adoption of the third policy will not, if tempered with "common
sense," preclude Ohio courts (1) from ruling that future advance mort-
gages may not be drafted as purchase-money mortgages and (2) from
severely penalizing the violators of such rule.
In adopting specific rules which are consonant with the third policy,
Ohio courts should carefully examine, not only today's economic needs,
but also those relevant legal precedents which embody the wisdom of the
past. Such an examination should adequately equip our courts to formu-
late rules which will eliminate the "obstruse and shifting character" of
future advance mortgage concepts which have, since the day of Chancel-
lor Kent, plagued the law of real property.
